India paratroopers were ready to deploy at Dhaka

During BDR munity on Feb 26, 2009

Enayet Karim: On February 26, 2009, the order arrived at five o’clock in the afternoon. Major Kamaldeep Singh Sadhu was in charge of the advance party of Parachute Regiment of the Indian Army that day. Emergency signal has just been activated. Several frontline paratrooper teams have been asked to be ready for deployment. India keeps a strike force of an entire battalion ready for emergency deployment round the clock. They are considered as the vanguard of India’s power projection.
A similar emergency signal was activated the night before and later cancelled. But when the signal activated again and the order came to have “five to six” IL-76 and AN-32 aircraft ready, Sadhu realized something big was about to happen.
Two and a half hours later, more than 1,000 Indian paratroopers landed at the Kalaikunda airfield in West Bengal. After deciding to spend the night there, Sadhu’s captain gave some instructions.
Members of Bangladesh’s Border Guard Force (BDR) mutinied. Killing high-ranking officers and their family members from the army. Newly elected Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who was then also in charge of the Defense Ministry, is under threat. She can no longer rely on the support of the army.
“She sought help from India…and that’s why we were stationed at the airport,” said Sadhu, waiting for new instructions. “And after landing in Dhaka, I was preparing for any eventuality.”
New Delhi was concerned about the safety of Indian diplomats in Dhaka. If violence escalates, these diplomats may also come under attack.
At the same moment, the most brutal massacre of army officers in the history of Bangladesh was taking place. Soon after the killings began, Hasina called her closest ally, the top Congress leader in New Delhi, newly appointed Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee. After hearing the incident, Mukherjee promised to “retaliate”. Arrangements were made for the deployment of paratroopers in response to a “request for help” from Dhaka. In addition, India’s Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon initiated urgent communication with the US, British, Japanese and Chinese envoys to ensure support for Hasina.
Apart from Kalaikunda, paratroopers have also been kept ready in Jorhat and Agartala. When the order came, the Indian troops entered Bangladesh from three sides.
The objective was to capture Zia International Airport (now Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport) and Tejgaon Airport. Later, Hasina was taken to a safe place after taking control of the Prime Minister’s residence Ganabhaban.
The brigade commander in charge of the operation began distribution of “phase one” ammunition to be used during active combat. “Extremely unusual” can be seen from the dire situation arising from this act.
There was a concern about how the Bangladesh Army would react. If the Bangladeshi generals go against Hasina, they will resist the Indian troops. Sadhu said that “if that were the case, then there is a whole corps of the Indian Army in East India,” from where additional troops would have been sent.
The Indian Army was on the brink of military intervention in Bangladesh on 27 February. But the final order did not come at last. Pinak Ranjan Chakraborty was then High Commissioner of India in Dhaka (2007-10). Bangladesh is his ancestral home. He called Hasina “Apa” with respect. He said, “We kept some forces on alert. I told Hasina that we are concerned about her safety.”
But why? Because India “did not know how far the situation would go.” Meanwhile, BDR rebels in Dhaka killed their Director General and his wife at Pilkhana headquarters. In this way, similar attacks against military officials started in various places across Bangladesh.
Then the army chief General Moinuddin Ahmed came under heavy pressure to take action against the rebels. But if he had taken such a step, it would have created a bloody situation and increased instability. At the same time, it would have put Hasina’s political and personal life at risk. He could have been killed by rebels or angry army officers. Or could have been overthrown in a military coup.
She was arrested once in 2007. The same thing could happen again. India did not want to take that risk. So, India did what it felt was necessary. India then threatened army chief Moin U Ahmed not to use force.
“People who were close to power at the time told me that General Moin was told not to use force. Otherwise, [Indian] paratroopers will descend on Dhaka within an hour,” said Touhid Hossain, who was Bangladesh’s foreign secretary at the time, now foreign advisor.
India’s threat was not on paper. “These things were actually happening … we would have intervened, if necessary,” a top Indian official involved in the foreign and security decision-making process assured me.
Ultimately the decision to deploy paratroopers was not finalized as General Moin backed out at the last moment. Brigadier General Mahmud Hossain, Director of Military Intelligence announced, “The Prime Minister has directed that the emerging crisis should be resolved politically. That’s how the problem was solved.”
At that time Lieutenant General (retired) Mahfuzur Rahman was in command of an army brigade in Bandarban. “He (Moin) should have actually given orders and allowed the army to deal with the situation,” he said.
Over the next two days, the mutiny spread to local BDR units in different parts of the country. According to Rahman, “It was not a political movement. As a military crisis, the army should have been allowed to deal with the situation within prescribed norms. But it is no longer done.”
If India had intervened in Bangladesh in 2009, it would have changed the history of the subcontinent. India’s decision not to intervene is equally important historically.
By threatening force to protect Hasina, India weakened the Bangladesh army in a way that allowed Hasina to later repress her political opponents with a free hand. In her second term, Hasina was freed from any political pressure from the military for the first time – entirely at the mercy of India.
What was the reason behind such a reaction of New Delhi? India’s intervention would have struck at the sovereignty of Bangladesh. Besides, the reputation of hegemony against India would have been strengthened.
India’s intervention would have spared Hasina’s life, but at the same time it would have proved the allegations against her as an “obedient” of India. Hasina’s political life would have been in danger.
India countered that Hasina instead saw the BDR rebellion as a ploy to destabilize her government. “She took her own security measures. But she also realized that the revolt had to be dealt with politically. It was for that purpose that she went and met the angry army officers who had lost their relatives and colleagues,” said Chakraborty.
Even after being humiliated and humiliated by the army officers at that time, Hasina remained steadfast in her position. She listened to them and took action against the rebels. “What she did was right, because it had a peaceful effect,” Hussain argued.
The rebellion was formally ended when the army entered Pilkhana with tanks “under the supervision” of the Home Ministry. About 200 people were arrested. The end of the rebellion and Moin’s show of restraint allowed Hasina to consolidate power. All the officials who misbehaved with Hasina lost their jobs one by one. BDR was disbanded.
“He faced the situation with great bravery and courage. A brave, iron man,” recalls Pinak Chakraborty.
But India had to come to the decision to use force in Bangladesh – essentially exposing India’s weakness on the eastern border.
We have to go back to the BNP-Jamaat period of 2001-06 and the November 26 Mumbai terror attack to trace the cause of this insecurity in India during the BDR insurgency. The wounds of the Mumbai attacks have not yet healed. New Delhi therefore viewed the BDR insurgency from a Pakistan-centric perspective and as a national security threat. Apart from searching for reasons for the anger of ordinary members of the BDR, Indian policymakers were concerned with the ideological infrastructure of the rebellion.
According to Chakraborty, “During the BNP-Jamaat regime, many Jamaat-activists were recruited as ordinary members of the BDR. They were apparently used by Pakistan.” After the hopeful dialogue of 2004-07, India’s relations with Pakistan finally deteriorated after the Mumbai terror attacks. In such a situation, New Delhi did not want instability in Dhaka or the rise of an anti-Indian government.
Although the BDR insurgency and various international links to the insurgency gave rise to many rumours, New Delhi’s interest level was much higher. On the one hand, Lok Sabha elections were approaching in May. On the other hand, the civil war in Sri Lanka was entering its final phase. Indian policy makers could not accept Hasina’s loss of power at this time. Menon informed the US that Jamaat and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (Huji-B) would attack India from Bangladesh if anything happened to Hasina.
In this regard, it is important to mention BNP MP Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury. Chowdhury was an influential shipping merchant. He had access to the trading activities of the Chittagong port. He was also Khaleda Zia’s advisor. He was considered an ISI agent since 1971. Early in the uprising, the Indian branch of the US-based CNN news network alleged that Chowdhry was fomenting the uprising on behalf of Pakistan.
An angry Chowdhury threatened to sue the channel and said that Khaleda Zia would not cooperate with Hasina in any way. On March 8, a week after the mutiny, he told Western diplomats that there was deep resentment against Hasina among senior and middle-ranking officials for mishandling the situation. According to Chowdhury, most of them support BNP.
Chowdhury’s role surrounding the mutiny and the impeachment of him by CNN India before the investigation began hinted at a complicated history. After the BNP-Jamaat government came to power, Bangladesh’s bilateral relations with India cooled despite continued formal talks on issues such as water sharing and economic ties – a role Chowdhury played in this.
India’s National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra was the first foreign dignitary to congratulate Khaleda Zia after her election victory in 2001. Mishra went to Dhaka on October 26-27, two weeks after taking charge of the Khaleda government. But this time it was seen that Khaleda’s son Tariq Rahman has more influence than his mother in making government and party decisions. According to Mathur (an Indian intelligence officer) who developed a relationship with Tarek, “He was sincere to India and did not allow his personal bias to come in the way of improving bilateral relations.”
But even this did not improve the relationship. Ending support to North-Eastern insurgents and protecting Hindu minorities – both of India’s red lines were crossed during the BNP era. Mishra conveyed Delhi’s concerns to Dhaka.
Similarly, it was at that time that a “tide” was seen in Bangladesh’s support for the insurgents in Northeast India. It was released on April 1, 2004. On that day, ten trucks full of weapons were caught in Chittagong. The largest arms shipment in the history of Bangladesh was destined for Northeast India. ULFA-I chief Paresh Barua, who was staying in a safe house in Dhaka, was controlling the shipment operation.
The large quantity of weapons was first transferred from a large ship to Bangladesh’s southernmost island of St. Martin and then to the docks of the government-owned Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Company Limited.
The owner of the St. Martin ship was none other than Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury, who, according to India, was acting on behalf of Pakistan with Tarek’s approval. According to Chakraborty, “Khaleda Zia’s over-ambitious son usurped a lot of power. Then started sending arms and ammunition.”
Soon after, India, in coordination with US agencies, provided Dhaka with a list of 148 rebel camps located in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Chakrabarty said, “They used to reply to us that no, no, we have verified and these camps are not there… the matter was turned into a cat and mouse game.